APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/723,370	11/26/2003	John N. Gross	JNG 98001C	8022

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J. NICHOLAS GROSS, ATTORNEY
2030 ADDISON ST.
SUITE 610
BERKELEY, CA 94704

EXAMINER
SPOONER, LAMONT M

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

	Application No.	Applicant(s)
Office Action Summary	10/723,370	GROSS ET AL.
	Examiner	Art Unit	
	LAMONT M. SPOONER	2626	

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE _3_ MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.
- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133).
  Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

1)☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on _27 April 2009_.

2a)☒ This action is **FINAL**.   2b)☐ This action is non-final.

3)☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

4)☒ Claim(s) _83-103_ is/are pending in the application.

    4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.

5)☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.

6)☒ Claim(s) _83-103_ is/are rejected.

7)☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.

8)☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

9)☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.

10)☒ The drawing(s) filed on _26 November 2003_ is/are: a)☒ accepted or b)☐ objected to by the Examiner.

    Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).

    Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).

11)☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

12)☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).

    a)☐ All b)☐ Some * c)☐ None of:

        1.☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.

        2.☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.

        3.☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

    * See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

1)☐ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)

2)☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)

3)☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____.

4)☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413) Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____

5)☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application

6)☐ Other: _____.

DETAILED ACTION

Introduction

1.   This office action is in response to applicant's amendment filed

4/27/09. Claims 83-103 are currently pending and have been examined.

Response to Arguments

2.   Applicant's arguments, see remarks, filed 4/27/09, with respect to the

35 USC 101 rejections have been fully considered and are persuasive.

The 35 USC 101 rejections of claims 96-103 have been withdrawn.

3.   Applicant's arguments filed 4/27/09, with respect the 35 USC 102

rejections as anticipated by Bradshaw (US 5,835,722) have been fully

considered but they are not persuasive.

        Applicant argues, p.12-14, "Bradshaw does not anticipate the claims"

and further presents the problem that Bradshaw addresses; "The Bradshaw

et. al. reference bears some superficial semblances to Some aspects of the

present invention, in that it is directed generally to the problem of blocking

the transmission of unwanted content, such as vulgar and/or pornographic

material. See, e.g. Bradshaw Abstract. The Bradshaw disclosure is

particularly concerned with so-called internet filters, which systems were

prevalent in library computer systems, especially in public schools. From a

high level perspective, however, the goal of this type of system, is slightly

different from that of the present invention, in that the Bradshaw approach

seeks to solve the problem of absolutely preventing a person from gaining

receipt of inappropriate material from a third party (i.e., such as the

Internet) towards the user, while the present invention is more oriented

towards the opposite situation: i.e., trying to give the user tools to allow

them to avoid disseminating inappropriate material to a third party.

While both problems share some similarities, there are also some

important differences which express themselves in how the problem is

optimally solved in both environments. In Bradshaw, for example, the

solution is directed mostly to ways of detecting and preventing

inappropriate requests for access to restricted files, restricted websites, etc.

using very rigid and inflexible filtering rules so that users can be blocked

from the same, and so that the user's access to the system can be

curtailed (or prohibited). The present invention is not so concerned with

access so much as it is with intelligent distribution, and so the Bradshaw

filtering techniques could be used in a complementary fashion with

embodiments practicing the present claims.

The other general limitations of Bradshaw include the fact that is
basically only a pure filtering mechanism, so there is little discussion given
to the kind of approach discussed in the present claims, which pertain more
generally to intelligent email distribution schemes. Moreover, while the
present invention uses some degree of filtering for examining document
content, and can be used in document filtering environments, it is extremely
flexible and unlike the system shown in Bradshaw which is relatively rigid,
and which appears to apply to every kind of communication passed into the
system without regard to the type of document, the sender, the recipient,
etc.

In Bradshaw restricting/blocking access is so important that, if the
system detects one of the prohibited words, it locks up the user's computer,
preventing him/her from further activity. See e.g., Bradshaw at column 9,
l1.1 - 9. It can be seen quite plainly that this is not practical in many real
world working environment where it is entirely possible that entry of such
prohibited words might be inadvertent, and yet an employee might waste
valuable time trying to get a supervisor to reset the employee's machine.
While some milder measures are contemplated (see e.g., column 9, ll. 31 -
35) it is apparent overall that the Bradshaw system is not intended or

geared to assist a user in any respect to understand an inappropriate error, and/or to permit fixing the same. However, various embodiments of the present claims accomplish just that.

Another limitation of Bradshaw is that it only teaches a system that is non-user adjustable. In other words, the filter is there, it is essentially fixed/static, and the assumption is that the user should not remove or adjust it in any fashion. This deficiency also is important vis-a-vis many of the claims of the present invention as discussed in more detail herein, which specifically concern allowing a user to control the document content directly.

Another important limitation in Bradshaw that is material to many of the pending claims concerns the fact that the filtering or detecting of inappropriate language is not done by considering the particular "intended recipient" of an email message. In other words, the filtering is rigid, fixed and indiscriminate, and does not allow a system to specify, for example, that certain entities might be suitable recipients of particular subject matter. There is no ability or consideration given to distinguish between potential recipients of files, unlike as set out in various of the present claims. Again, this is a simple consequence of the fact that Bradshaw is looking at an

opposite problem - i.e., how to restrict access - and not how to prevent

dissemination - so it cannot teach this aspect of the invention as expressed

and amplified in other of the pending claims.

Finally, other claims emphasize for example that the content of an

email can be checked by reference to threshold values (i.e., by specifying a

language sensitivity for a particular email). In other words the present

inventions describe embodiments where different filters can be used with

different groups, and different filters/thresholds can be used with different

documents. These features are plainly not described or suggested in

Bradshaw, and accordingly, these claims, too, are believed to be

allowable."

However, the Examiner notes, Bradshaw teaches applicant's claimed

invention, despite the applicant arguing the problem to be solved, and

differences regarding the problem to be solved. Applicant further presents,

ease of use arguments, rigidity, and non-flexibility by user. However, it is

evident that Bradshaw teaches each and every element as currently cited,

and that the author of a message, wherein the author has supervisory

authority, is able to use Bradshaw's invention, in the same manner as

applicant has currently claimed. Wherein anyone with the supervisory

authority, has flexibility, can control the system, modify the libraries of prohibited words, create new libraries of prohibited words, and has complete ease of use.

Applicant argues as seen above, "From a high level perspective, however, the goal of this type of system, is slightly different from that of the present invention, in that the Bradshaw approach seeks to solve the problem of absolutely preventing a person from gaining receipt of inappropriate material from a third party (i.e., such as the Internet) towards the user, while the present invention is more oriented towards the opposite situation: Le., trying to give the user tools to allow them to avoid disseminating inappropriate material to a third party." However, this argument is not complete, wherein Bradshaw specifically addresses the issue of disseminating inappropriate material to a third party via electronic message. Applicant further admits, in the remarks, p.14 para. 3, 4, that there is a generated message, to be disseminated, however contends that the supervisor is not allowed to be a user. However, the Examiner has specifically detailed to capabilities of the supervisor below.

The Examiner has specifically addressed the applicant's direct arguments as they pertain to the claims below, beginning on p.14 of applicant's remarks.

Applicant argues, with regard to claim 83, p.14 para. 4, "There is no indication that the "supervisor' is allowed to be a "user' so that he/she could circumvent the system as the Examiner suggests." However, the Examiner cannot concur with the applicant's arguments. The cited section, explicitly states, as shown by the applicant, p.14, "The "user" may be a child, student, or company employee. **The "supervisor" may be a <u>parent</u>, teacher, or company supervisor, i.e. <u>anyone</u> who has authority to control the <u>user</u> of the computer system in which the X-Stop is installed.**" It is the Examiner's position that a "parent" is inherently a "child" of someone, and furthermore, "anyone who has authority to control the user of the computer system" inherently qualifies a supervisor, which has the ability to use the computer system and authority to control himself/herself, and thus quite naturally falls into the category of a user. Without proper support, or a preponderance of evidence from the applicant that a "parent" cannot be a child, or a supervisor does not have the ability to control himself/herself, the Examiner is unable to be persuaded by the

applicants arguments, and all arguments regarding Bradshaw as pertaining
to this matter.

Applicant further argues, with regard to claim 83, "[I]n Bradshaw even
if allowed access to the email programs as the Examiner suggests it is not
able to select "... a language filter for checking words in the mail
message..."" However, the Examiner cannot concur. Bradshaw explicitly
teaches, C.3 lines 30-47- a supervisor adding the language filters
(libraries), thus the supervisor has the ability to select which language
filters and words being applied. Furthermore, in the event of a single library,
one still has the ability to select "that" library.

Applicant arguments regarding claim 83, as it pertains to Bradshaw
remain unpersuasive, and claims 84, 87, 92, 94, 96, 100, and 101, which
rely on the same reasons, are also unpersuasive.

Applicant's arguments regarding claim 86, are also unpersuasive, as
Bradshaw teaches a plurality of language filters, in the form of editable and
creatable libraries, (C.3 lines 30-47-his libraries, and Fig. 2-his Libraries
Loaded in Memory), and Cohen, which teaches the identification of a
triggered language filter, in combination produce the amended claims.

Regarding applicant's arguments with respect to claims 88, 89 and 97 in view of Stamps, "There is no indication that the dictionaries are configured to contain words that are specifically identified as offensive/inappropriate. Moreover, there is no indication that the dictionary contains both English and non-English words. The Examiner notes this is an attack on Stamp individually, and omits the offensive language filter and library with an initial language, editable by the supervisor as taught by Bradshaw in the arguments. Furthermore, omits the discussion and motivation to combine Stamps with Bradshaw which consequently produces a second language dictionary with offensive words, see Stamps C.3 lines 31-44-his various language dictionaries, which second dictionary is part of a second electronic file which is separate from a first electronic file used for said first set of words and can be considered separately from said first electronic file (ibid, his each dictionary). Therefore, at the time of the invention, it would have been obvious to modify Bradshaw's email message (document) with spell checking and language filter for foreign language words. The motivation for doing so would have been to have correct spelling and improper foreign language words. Therefore, applicants above arguments remain unpersuasive.

Regarding applicant's arguments with respect to claims 90, 91, 93, 98 and 99 in view of Bradshaw and Russell-Falla. The Examiner only relies on Russell-Falla for teaching wherein an author is alerted only if a sensitivity threshold specified by the author is exceeded (C.5.lines 34-51-his threshold value set, abstract). In the cited section, Russell-Falla explicitly teaches, "threshold values are used to influence the decision of whether or not a particular digital dataset should be deemed to contain the selected category of information content. Thus, anyone ordinarily skilled in the art, would have the knowledge of a threshold as applicable to a particular dataset, and thus as combined with Bradshaw, teach applicants claimed invention. Therefore, applicant's arguments, regarding the "thresholds" remain unpersuasive.

Regarding applicant's arguments with respect to claims 95, 102 and 103, in view of Bradshaw with Rayson (US 5,761,689), the Examiner is not persuaded by applicant's arguments. Applicant argues, "Applicant disagrees with the argument that one skilled in the art would reasonable combine Rayson with Bradshaw." However, the Examiner disagrees with the applicant, and believes the combination provides an option to Bradshaw which allows the system to automatically scan an entry either

immediately as input or after an idle period, for correction (ibid, Rayson-C.3

lines 24-30, abstract and summary).

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102

4.   The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35

U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in

this Office action:

> A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
>
> (e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language.

5.   Claims 83, 84, 87, 92, 94, 96, 100 and 101are rejected under 35

U.S.C. 102(e) as being anticipated by Bradshaw (US 5,835,722).

As per **claim 83**, Bradshaw teaches a method of permitting an author

of an electronic mail (email) message to check text content using an

electronic text editor program operating on a computing system, the

method comprising:

(a) permitting the author to select at least one language filter (C.3

lines 30-47- a supervisor adding the language filters (libraries), thus the

supervisor has the ability to select which language filters and words being

applied, see below discussion of supervisor taken as the author/user) for

checking words in the email message (C.7 lines 18-26-his foul language

filter), which language filter includes a first set of words identified as

offensive and/or potentially inappropriate for use in connection with an

intended recipient of the email message (ibid, his library of foul language);

and

(b) receiving input words entered by the author as text for the email

message (C.8 lines 35-37-his author typing the words);

(c) inspecting said input words to determine if they fall within said

language filter (C.8 lines 35-40-his inspection of the words and comparison

to his libraries);

(d) alerting the author when one or more of said input words fall

within said language filter (C.8 lines 54-58, his blocking screen);

(e) permitting the author to change words within the email message

after step (d) and before the email message is transmitted to said intended

recipient (C.8 lines 55-59-his typed password, thus allowing access to the

email, at this point there is no transmission, and C.4 lines 25-28-his text

editor, wherein it is inherent that the author with access in a text editor, can

make changes); and

wherein the author of the email message can cause the email

message be transmitted by the computing system to said intended recipient

even if the words in such email message still fall within said language filter

(C.2 lines 57-67-screen production of email, C.3 lines 10-34, C.4 lines 18-

21, Bradshaw explicitly teaches giving screening of content of a user,

libraries, and content for sending by a user, the Examiner notes that the

actual blocking mechanism that prevents the mail from being sent is known

by a supervisor, in the form of a password, C.8 lines 59-61, however, the

Examiner notes a user can be a supervisor, C.5 lines 32-34, explicitly detail

the supervisor as "anyone who has authority to control the user of the

computer system in which X-Stop is installed." Thus, there is nothing to

prevent a Supervisor from creating a message, and having the message

dynamically scanned and prompted for vulgar language, blocked from

transmission, entering the password, (editing or not the content) and

sending the message through his email application, as X-stop is running on

the application.

As per **claim 84**, Bradshaw teaches claim 83. Bradshaw further

teaches wherein said language filter includes obscene, vulgar and/or racist

words found in a first pre-programmed dictionary created without input from

the author (C.3 lines 30, 31-library, C.6 lines 9-14-his third library, see Fig.

2-his stored library).

As per **claim 87**, Bradshaw teaches claim 83. Bradshaw further

teaches a step (f): checking one or more additional electronic message files

according to steps (a) through (d) (C.2 lines 61-67-his documents, C.5 lines

35-40-his transmission of the any messages/data).

As per **claim 92**, Bradshaw teaches claim 83. Bradshaw further

teaches wherein steps (a) through (e) are implemented as a software

routine in a machine readable form executable by a personal computer

(Bradshaw, C.5.lines 3-25).

As per **claims 94, 100 and 101**, claims 94, 100 and 101, set forth

limitations similar to claim 83, and are thus rejected for the same reasons

and under the same rationale.

Bradshaw further teaches inspecting said input word substantially

immediate in time after it is entered to determine if it falls within said

language filter, and wherein said input word is checked beofre the author

has entered another input word (C.8 lines 35-60-as the user types, X-Stop

monitors and checks the content of each character, claims 94, 100 and

101).

As per **claim 96**, Bradshaw teaches a computer program for checking text content of an email message using an electronic text editor program operating on a computing system (C.5 lines 25, 26-his software), comprising:

a language filter for checking words in the email message (C.7 lines 18-26-his foul language filter), which language filter is an electronic dictionary which includes a set of words that could be offensive and/or potentially inappropriate for use in connection with an intended recipient of the email message (ibid, his library of foul language); and a content checking routine which is adapted for:

i) receiving input words entered by the author as text for the email message (C.8 lines 35-37-his author typing the words);

ii) inspecting said input words to determine if they fall within said language filter (C.8 lines 35-40-his inspection of the words and comparison to his libraries);

iii) generating an alert to the author when ea one or more of said input words fall within said language filter (C.8 lines 54-58, his blocking screen);

iv) permitting the author to change words within the email message

after an alert is generated and before the email message is transmitted to

said intended recipient (C.8 lines 55-59-his typed password, thus allowing

access to the email, at this point there is no transmission , and C.4 lines

25-28-his text editor, wherein it is inherent that the author with access in a

text editor, can make changes); and

> wherein the author of the email message can cause the email
message to be transmitted by the computing system to said intended
recipient even if words in such email message still fall within said language
filter (C.2 lines 57-67-screen production of email, C.3 lines 10-34, C.4 lines
18-21, Bradshaw explicitly teaches giving screening of content of a user,
libraries, and content for sending by a user, the Examiner notes that the
actual blocking mechanism that prevents the mail from being sent is known
by a supervisor, in the form of a password, C.8 lines 59-61, however, the
Examiner notes a user can be a supervisor, C.5 lines 32-34, explicitly detail
the supervisor as "anyone who has authority to control the user of the
computer system in which X-Stop is installed." Thus, there is nothing to
prevent a Supervisor from creating a message, and having the message
dynamically scanned and prompted for vulgar language, blocked from
transmission, entering the password, (editing or not the content) and

sending the message through his email application, as X-stop is running on

the application).

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103

6.   The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the

basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

> (a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set
> forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
> the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
> invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
> Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.

7.   Claims 85 and 86 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being

unpatentable over Bradshaw et al. (Bradshaw, US 5,835,722) in view of

Cohen (US 5,796,948).

As per **claim 85**, Bradshaw teaches the method of claim 83, but lacks

providing a highlighting of any words which are determined to fall within

said language filter along with an accompanying visual warning. However,

Cohen teaches providing a highlighting of any words which are determined

to fall within said language filter along with an accompanying visual warning

(C.4.lines 30-50-his bracketing of each profanity, and profanity message

displayed to the user). Therefore, at the time of the invention, it would have

been obvious to one ordinarily skilled in the art to modify Bradshaw's

warning display with Cohen's highlighting of words, providing the benefit of identifying words falling within the language filter.

As per **claim 86**, Bradshaw teaches claim 83. Bradshaw further teaches a plurality of language filters (C.3 lines 30-47-his created libraries, and Fig. 2-his Libraries Loaded in Memory).

Bradshaw lacks explicitly teaching identifying which ones of a plurality of language filter were triggered to the author during step (d). However, Cohen teaches identifying a language filter to the author which was triggered during step (d) (C.4.lines 36-38-his profanity message). Therefore, at the time of the invention, it would have been obvious to one ordinarily skilled in the art to modify Bradshaw with Cohen's profanity message, providing the benefit of identifying the triggered language filters.

8.   Claims 88, 89 and 97 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bradshaw, as applied to claim 83 above, and further in view of Stamps et al. (Stamps, US 5,437,036).

As per **claims 88 and 89**, Bradshaw teaches claim 83, but lacks including a step (f): checking spelling of the email message, and further lack wherein said language filter includes a second dictionary with foreign language words.

However, Stamps teaches checking spelling (C.3.lines 17-30-his spell

checking), and a dictionary with foreign language words (C.3 lines 31-44-

his various language dictionaries), which second dictionary is part of a

second electronic file which is separate from a first electronic file used for

said first set of words and can be considered separately from said first

electronic file (ibid, his each dictionary). Therefore, at the time of the

invention, it would have been obvious to modify Bradshaw's email message

(document) with spell checking and language filter for foreign language

words. The motivation for doing so would have been to have correct

spelling and improper foreign language words.

As per **claim 97**, Bradshaw teaches claim 96, and further teaches

wherein said language filter includes at least a first dictionary and a second

separate dictionary (Fig. 2 his libraries), but lacks said alert includes an

indication of which of said first dictionary or said second dictionary was

triggered by said alert.

However, Stamps teaches said language filter includes at least a first

dictionary and a second separate dictionary, and said alert includes an

indication of which of said first dictionary or said second dictionary was

triggered by said alert (C.3 lines 31-44-his various language dictionaries,

C.4 lines 5-16 and C.5 lines 63-67-his specified dictionaries). Therefore, at

the time of the invention, it would have been obvious to modify Bradshaw's

libraries dictionary with two independent dictionaries. The motivation for

doing so would have been identify the dictionary for the correction (Stamps,

ibid).

9.   Claims 90, 91, 93, 98 and 99 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as

being unpatentable over Bradshaw, as applied to claim 83 above, and

further in view of Russell-Falla et al. (Russell-Falla, US 6,675,162).

        As per **claims 90 and 91**, Bradshaw teaches claim 83, but lacks

teaching wherein an author is alerted during step (d) only if a sensitivity

threshold specified by the author is exceeded, and wherein said sensitivity

threshold is specified as a numerical value ranging from 1 to 10.

        However, Russell-Falla teaches wherein an author is alerted only if a

sensitivity threshold specified by the author is exceeded (C.5.lines 34-51,

abstract). The Examiner takes Official notice that a sensitivity threshold can

have a range of numerical values. Therefore, at the time of the invention, it

would have been obvious to modify Bradshaw's language filter with a

threshold specified by an author, wherein the threshold has a range (such

as 1-10). The motivation for doing so would have to allow user designate a

threshold to filter content (Russel-Falla, abstract).

As per **claims 93 and 98**, claims 93 and 98 set forth limitations

similar to claim 83 and 91, and are thus rejected for the same reasons and

under the same rationale.

As per **claim 99**, Bradshaw and Russell-Falla make obvious claim 98,

Russell-Falla also teaches wherein said sensitivity threshold is used during

a check of individual words in said language filter (C.5.lines 65-67,

abstract-his email).

10.   Claims 95, and 102, and 103 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as

being unpatentable over Bradshaw in view of Rayson et al. (Rayson, US

5,761,689).

As per **claims 95, 102, and 103**, claims 95, and 102, set forth

limitations similar to claim 83, and are thus rejected for the same reasons

and under the same rationale.

Bradshaw lacks inspecting said input words during idle periods when

the author is not interacting with said electronic text editor program to

determine if such input words fall within said language filter and said inut

words are also checked for spelling during said idle periods (claims 95, 102

and 103).

However, Rayson teaches inspecting said input words during idle periods when the author is not interacting with said electronic text editor program (C.2.lines 12-24-his automatic as immediate and delimiting as before the user enters another word, C.3.lines 24-31-as his spell check, and language filtered as misspellings are interpreted as inappropriate for use in connection with an intended recipient of an email message-claims 102, 103). Therefore, at the time of the invention, it would have been obvious to modify Bradshaw's language filter with after an idle period scan of the words to be filtered. The motivation for doing so would have been to automatically scan an entry either immediately as input or after an idle period, for correction (ibid, Rayson-C.3 lines 24-30, abstract and summary).

Conclusion

11.   Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a

first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final

action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the

THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory

period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any

extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the

mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory

period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final

action.

12.   Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications

from the examiner should be directed to LAMONT M. SPOONER whose

telephone number is (571)272-7613. The examiner can normally be

reached on 8:00 AM - 5:00 PM.

     If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the

examiner's supervisor, David Hudspeth can be reached on 571/272-7843.

The fax phone number for the organization where this application or

proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

     Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained

from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status

information for published applications may be obtained from either Private

PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is

available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR

system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on

access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center

(EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a

USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated

information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-

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/Talivaldis Ivars Smits/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2626